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Abstract
In this paper, we investigate the voluntary use of
password management applications in order to address
a decades-old and ubiquitous information security
problem related to poor password management. In our
exploratory analysis, we investigate two related issues:
(1) why home end-users chose not to use password
management applications and (2) why high behavioral
intentions to use password management applications
did not always lead to actual usage for certain users.
We found that issues related to the technology such as
lack of trust or memory limitations, individual issues
such as perceived costs and benefits, and a lack of
concern about the threat (threat apathy) were the
primary inhibitors of lack of use. For those that had
high intentions to use a password management
application but failed to actually use the software, we
found that a variety of individual issues such as lack of
immediacy and having insufficient time were the
primary inhibitors leading to this breakdown.

1. Introduction
Organizations often rely upon tailored information
security policies (ISPs) and security education training
and awareness (SETA) programs to inform employees
of the security threats they face and the appropriate, and
often mandatory, actions to mitigate those threats [10,
12]. Improving the content and impact of corporate
SETA programs is often a goal of organizational
security behavior research [29, 18]. Home end-users, in
comparison, do not have the benefit of an established
ISP or professional SETA program in their personal
lives [2]. As a result, home end-users may have little
understanding of the security threats they face or the
tools and actions they can take to protect their
information assets [2].
Even if home end-users do understand the risks and
appropriate mitigating actions, prescriptive security
behaviors are completely voluntary. For example,
although users may understand the need to keep their
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PC’s operating system current with the latest security
updates, compliance is completely voluntary with few
repercussions until a security incident, such as a
ransomware or malware infection, occurs. Research
into improving home end-user security behaviors is thus
challenged by a potential lack of threat awareness, lack
of awareness of mitigating security behaviors, and
perhaps even a lack of desire to voluntarily take
recommended actions [2].
One home end-user information security behavior
related to a variety of different threats is password
management.
Within organizations, employers
typically mandate the use of strong passwords and the
regular changing of those passwords. However, home
end-users do not have this mandate and often do not
change their relatively weak passwords [21]. Due to the
difficulty in maintaining and remembering multiple
passwords, many home end-users also have a single
password for multiple sites, which is very problematic
especially if the password is relatively weak [13, 38].
Password management applications exist to help
resolve these types of problems, especially for the home
end-user who does not benefit from built-in network
applications that require certain types of password
practices. Computer security professionals, the United
States Computer Emergency Readiness Team (USCERT), and the internationally recognized SANS
Institute all strongly recommend the use of password
manager applications [45, 25, 26]. Yet, adoption rates
in the workplace and for home end-users are very low
[24]. The purpose of our paper is to investigate why this
is the case. We specifically address the following two
interconnected research questions: (1) why do home
end-users fail to adopt password management
applications and (2) why do certain home end-users
have high behavioral intentions to use password
management applications but then fail to follow through
on those intentions?
In order to address these research questions, we
conducted an empirical investigation of 283 college
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students who were presented information about the risks
of poor password management and given the
recommendation to adopt the use of a dedicated
password manager application.
The participants
decided to either voluntarily adopt (or not) the use of a
free commercial password management application.
We then asked our research subjects open ended
questions concerning their adoption intentions and the
reasons why they actually adopted and used the
password management application.
We found
individual issues related to laziness, lack of time, and
lack of immediacy were the primary behavioral
inhibitors, while the strongest behavioral enabler was a
belief in the response efficacy of the recommended
password management application. We also found a
variety of individual issues led to the breakdown
between having high behavioral intentions to use the
software and a failure to actually use the software.

2. Background & Related Literature
Much of the research on information security
practices focuses on behavioral intentions and not on
actual behaviors [41, 14]. This is primarily due to
decades of research that has empirically demonstrated
that there is generally a fairly strong correlation between
behavioral intentions and actual behaviors across a
variety of actions [1, 3, 22]. However, more recent
studies have started to evaluate both security intent and
actual behaviors [15, 44, 7], but none have specifically
explored factors that inhibit or support the transition
from intent to actual behavior.
Numerous theories have been used to explain
behavioral intentions in the context of information
security actions.
The most common theoretical
perspectives are the theory of planned behavior,
protection motivation theory, and general deterrence
theory [4]. Most of the published research, irrespective
of the theories being used, focuses on the first or second
order antecedents of behavioral intentions with the
assumption that there is a strong link between intentions
and actual behaviors. This has largely been left as an
untested assumption. Therefore, more research is
needed to determine the enablers and inhibitors
associated with the link between security related
behavioral intentions and actual behaviors [41, 14].
In addition to suggesting that future information
security research focus on both behavioral intentions
and actual behaviors, Siponen and Vance [36] call for
information security research that has more practical
value in the user context. One such practically relevant
security issue, but still theoretically rich, is password
management. The password is still the primary means
of protecting personal information online [25] and

managing (which includes remembering) all of one’s
different passwords is still a major problem [42],
especially for home end-users who tend to be very
casual concerning their passwords [21].
The primary problems associated with end-user
passwords is that they are often weak (easy to guess) and
many users re-use the same password on multiple online
accounts [25, 45]. Whereas weak passwords will
always be easy for criminals to guess, even the use of
very strong passwords on multiple accounts is
dangerous because all it takes is one account to be
compromised for several other accounts to be affected.
Survey data indicate that up to 2/3 of online users use
the same password for multiple or all online accounts
[17, 30].
The effect of poor password management practices
is tangible. According to the well-respected 2016
Verizon Data Breach Investigations Report (DBIR),
legitimate user credentials (login ids and passwords)
were used in over 50% of all reported data breaches in
2015. An analysis of 2260 confirmed data breaches in
2015 determined 63% involved “leveraging a weak,
default, or stolen password” [40] (p. 20). Separate
analysis of actual attacker tactics shows they
specifically target end-user passwords in order to gain
access to both personal and corporate information
resources [6].
The security actions recommended to combat weak
and/or reused passwords are to create and use only
strong passwords and use a unique password for each
end-user account [35]. Strong passwords are typically
defined as passwords that contain at least 12
alphanumeric characters, both upper and lower case
letters, at least one number, and at least one special
character [35]. Unfortunately, the average end-user has
dozens of personal and work-related passwords [17],
and remembering many strong passwords is difficult.
To assist users with proper password hygiene, the use of
password
manager
applications
is
strongly
recommended [45, 25].
Password management
applications store all of a user’s passwords in one
location that is cryptographically protected and
accessible through one (ideally) strong master
passphrase, alleviating the burden of memorizing many
unique strong passwords [25]. Empirical analysis of
actual password behaviors has shown that users can
remember a small number of strong, complex
passwords, especially when used often (such as when
unlocking the password manager) [42].
There are many password managers available for
purchase, including several highly-regarded free
applications.
In this study, we introduced the
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participants to several password managers but
specifically recommended the use of LastPass, a free
password manager that is widely used in both
enterprises and by end-users (see https://lastpass.com/
for more detail).
From the behavioral adoption perspective, there are
two main issues associated with password management
applications that require additional research. First,
behavioral intentions to use password management
software have been shown to not be good indicators of
actual usage of the software [42]. This makes password
management applications an excellent context to
investigate the link between intention to use the
software and actual use of the software, which will
strengthen the theoretical understanding of security
adoption technologies (more broadly than just password
management applications). For instance, it is possible
that certain antecedents of intentions may be better
contextualized as both direct and indirect effects on
actual behaviors.
Second, adoption rates of password managers are
very low [24, 26]. This category of software solves a
very important problem, but home end-users have low
adoption intentions and actual usage of these software
packages [33, 26]. Therefore, it is important from both
a theoretical and a practical standpoint to understand
why this is the case. Existing literature offers certain
hypotheses such as the software may be difficult to use,
the real or perceived costs of using these applications
may outweigh the benefits, a lack of self-confidence on
behalf of the home end-user, and so on [4]. More
research is needed to further our understanding of the
low adoption rates of a category of applications that is,
generally speaking, highly useful and purportedly easy
to use.

3. Research Design & Methods
3.1 Research Subjects
In order to investigate password management
software adoption among home end-users, we used
undergraduate college students from a US private
university as our research subjects. While there is often
criticism about using college students in academic
research, much of that criticism comes from trying to
extend the results of student-derived data to other
organizational contexts and populations [31]. When
investigating home end-user information security
practices, however, we consider college students an
excellent population to study due to their extensive use
of technology, familiarity with online applications (such
as social networking sites and school-related
information systems), and also the perception that

college students are not overly conscientious with their
information privacy and security [20, 23]. Additionally,
many college students are expected to enter the greater
work force in the next 1 to 4 years. Therefore,
understanding and improving the security behaviors of
this demographic is important at both the individual and
organizational levels. Furthermore, numerous studies
that have explored security behaviors (including
password management) [7, 38, 42, 16, 27] have used
college students in their research studies.
A total of 372 undergraduate students were provided
the opportunity to participate in this study in return for
a small amount of course extra credit. A total of 286
responses were collected during the first phase of the
data collection (which included the fear appeal and
measurement of behavioral intent), representing a 77%
response rate. After eliminating those who participated
in the first part of the study but did not complete the
second phase (which collected information about actual
security behavior), we were left with 283 usable data
points for the second phase.
Of the 283 usable data points, 10 (3.5%) were
already using a dedicated password manager application
(LastPass 1Password, KeePass, or similar). These 10
participants were asked more detailed questions about
their experiences with password management software
and excluded from the second phase of our study. From
the remaining 273 participants, 37 (13.5%) decided to
install and use a password manager after the first data
collection phase, and 236 (86.5%) decided not to install
and use the application.
3.2 Data Collection
The first phase of the data collection provided the
participants with a link to an online video that included
a fear appeal message related to poor password
management and a survey to measure behavioral
constructs and their intent to install and use a password
manager within the following week. The fear appeal
inside of the threat message is crucial in defining the
threat and providing mitigating actions [7, 27]. For this
part of our study, we used the guidelines of Witte, et al.
[43] and the summarized fear appeal findings from
Ruiter, et al. [34] to build our fear appeal message.
Witte, et al. [43] argue that successful fear appeals must
include two components – (1) a threat component that
articulates the magnitude of the threat whereby there is
a real possibility that the danger associated with the
threat can occur to the participant (on a personal level),
and (2) a recommended response that communicates
that the prescriptive solution works, is within the
capability of the recipient of the message, and also
addresses common barriers from performing the
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designated response. The specific threat message was
formatted
in
a
video
(available
at
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ru3JXo7YoVc).
The contents and video format of the message were
developed through a series of three pilot studies with
students and academics.

that could only be answered through the use of a
password manager (as described above). Participants
that chose not to use a password manager were asked an
open-ended question about the reasons they used to
justify the non-action as well as their intentions to use a
password manager sometime in the future.

All questions for the survey instrument came from
pre-existing and pre-validated scales. From Boss, et al.
[7], we used the definition of behavioral intent as the
self-reported intention to perform the subject security
action (in this case, install and use a password manager).
Behavioral intent to use a password manager application
was measured in both data collection phases
(immediately after the security threat message and one
week later when actual behavior was measured). In
order to differentiate between whether a participant
merely downloaded the recommended software or
actually used the application to perform password
management functions, we asked several questions that
could be answered only by using the “Security
Challenge” tool built into the password manager. These
questions included the users providing the relative
strength of their master password associated with their
password manager, the aggregate security score for all
their accounts as determined by the application, and the
total number of accounts in their password manager
application at the time of data collection. These
additional details were captured to provide proof of
application installation and use that could only come
from a password manager and also to gather data about
initial use of the password manager application for areas
of future examination.

3.3 Qualitative Analysis

The second phase of the data collection was
conducted one week after completion of the first survey
to ascertain whether the participants followed through
with the security behavior, which was the adoption of
the password management application. The timeframe
of one week between data collection was determined by
interviewing 15 students who were taking part in a classrelated password manager application pilot study.
These students almost unanimously stated that if they
did not take a voluntary action within a couple of days
of being exposed to the action, they would probably
never take the recommended action without being reprompted. One week was chosen to conservatively
allow enough time for a participant to voluntarily install
a password manager application or not.
In the second phase of the data collection,
participants were asked whether they took the
recommended, yet voluntary, security-relation action to
download and start using a free password manager
application (LastPass) or some other password manager.
Actual behavior was adjudicated based upon questions

Empirical analyses of participant responses focused
on identifying and exploring behavioral factors that
interfered with or facilitated the transition of intending
to install and use a password manager. To accomplish
this goal, we conducted an iterative coding process
modeled after Vaast and Kaganer [39].
The first step of the analyses consisted of inductive
open coding [39] of the participant open-ended
responses for both compliance with the recommended
security behavior (use of a password manager) and noncompliance. We started by having two of the authors
randomly select 50 participant responses from the
dataset and code them independently. There was no a
priori coding schema; we allowed the codes to emerge
from the data. A coding unit was defined as a segment
of text ranging from one sentence to one paragraph.
However, a single segment of text could include several
codes.
We coded the 50 responses independently from each
other. After each of the coding rounds, we reviewed our
respective codes and reconciled any discrepancies
through discussion prior to consolidating the findings.
Per [39], we used the coding schema from the first round
to evaluate another 50 randomly-selected responses
each, while simultaneously modifying and extending
the coding schema to capture new and emerging themes
and concepts [19].
In order to ensure that all coders understood the
definitions of each category, we brought in another
coder that did not take part in the code creation process.
One of the original coders and the new coder examined
50 responses together using the final coding schema and
then independently coded a sample of the same 100
responses to assess inter-rater reliability. The two
coders agreed 89% of the time, which is a simple
Cohen’s Kappa value of 0.85, suggesting an acceptable
level of inter-coder reliability [28].
Coding
disagreements were discussed and resolved together.
Eventually, we evaluated all of the responses iteratively
and independently. The resulting coding scheme and
associated themes are defined and illustrated with
examples in Table 1.
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4. Results
Although the focus of this paper is on qualitative
content analysis, we do incorporate basic descriptive
statistics in order to further guide the interpretation of
our data, which is consistent with the recommendation
of Boyatzis [9]. The behavioral intentions scores of
those that chose not to take the security action (mean =
4.05, n = 236, s.d. = 1.43) showed effectively neutral
intentions to install and use a password manager, which
played out. However, comparing the results of the first
phase behavioral intentions scores with the second
phase data collection scores for these participants (mean
= 4.66, n = 236, s.d. = 1.48) showed a statistically
significant increase in the same population’s intention to
use a password manager in the future (t = -7.02, df =
237, p < 0.001). This indicates that study participants
that were exposed to the poor password management
threat message from this study were influenced to at
least consider using a password manager in the future
following the second phase of the data collection. We
did not measure whether this same group of participants
eventually did install and use a password manager.

“I thought about installing a password manager
application, but just didn't have the time to set aside
to do so.”
In some extreme cases, the respondents took a
cavalier approach towards their lack of time
management, identifying themselves as lazy even in the
face of danger.
“Most likely arrogance and being lazy. I have never
had one of my passwords stolen so would most
likely wait until that happened before installing a
password manager.”
Lack of Immediacy
A sizable portion (15%) of the participants identified
their intent to take the security action, but because they
did not act promptly, they ended up forgetting to do so.
This is an interesting issue, especially with all of the
distractions from the plethora of different gadgets that
users face on a daily basis. For example,
"I got distracted by something else and honestly
forgot, but when I remember I want to try one!!"

Our qualitative data analysis identified eight
individual behavioral inhibitors that influenced study
participants against taking the recommended security
action of installing and using a dedicated password
manager application. We grouped these factors into
three main themes: (1) Individual Inhibitors, (2) Threat
Apathy, and (3) Technology Inhibitors.

And, in numerous cases, having to identify the main
reason for their inaction led to a restatement of their
planned intent to take the security action in the future
(which is supported by the quantitative analysis reported
earlier).
“I forgot about it--I will install one now that I've been
reminded again.”

4.1 Individual Inhibitors

Excessive Effort Required

We define individual inhibitors as any real or
perceived conflict with or drain on limited individual
resources to include tangible assets (such as time and
money) or cognitive capacity (such as memory,
perceived self-efficacy, expected effort required).
Individual inhibitors were reported by 72% of the study
participants. Our analysis identified four factors
(presented in order of highest occurrence) that interfered
with our participants’ personal capacity to take the
recommended security action.

The third most cited (12.2% of respondents)
individual behavioral inhibitor related to the perceived
effort required to take the security action. When the
expected effort required to install and populate the
password manager was perceived as more than the
participant was willing to expend to counter the
password management threat, they abandoned their
intentions to take the action.
“I didn't want to take the time to set up a new
application and enter in all my passwords.”

Insufficient Time

However, there were cases where the expected level
of effort would be considered acceptable in the future
when the participants’ professional circumstances
changed.

The most common factor cited in our study (41% of
the participants) for deciding not to take the
recommended security action was a perceived lack of
time to install (or configure) and use the password
manager. In many cases, the respondents explicitly
stated an intention to take the security action, but other
tasks had higher priority. For example:
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Table 1: Themes, codes, definitions, and examples from participants that did not perform the recommended security action

Theme

Codes
(Behavioral Inhibitors)

Definitions

Examples

Insufficient Time

Participants reported that they did not have the
slack time resources to allocated towards taking
the security action

"Time. I put it on my todo list but I prioritized other
things. To be fair, i'm usually slow about doing
updates and such. I will do it eventually."

Lack of Immediacy

Participant planned to install the application but
did not so do promptly; in time they eventually
forgot to follow through with their intention.

"I honestly forgot, but when I remember I want to
try one!! "

Excessive Effort

Expected effort to install and populate the
password manager is more than the participant
wants to expend

"I didn't want to take the time to look up my
password every time I encountered a log in. It
would be time consuming for something that I do
not feel I am at high risk for."

Low Self-efficacy

Participants unsure if they are capable of
installing and using password manager
applications properly

"I feel as though I am not good enough with
computers to know how to install a password
manager so I'll just try to remember my passwords."

Threat Apathy
(Salience = 25%)

Threat Apathy

Participants do not think that the threats from
poor password management are worthy of taking
any additional action.

"I do not feel like I need one. I typically remember
most of my passwords even if it takes me a try or
two for a site I do not have to enter the password for
very often."

Technology Inhibitors
(Salience = 20%)

Alternative Solution

Participants already have some kind of password
management system in place, but not a dedicated
application.

"I feel that I can more effectively manage my own
passwords by manually recording them in a
physical notebook."

Lack of Trust

Participants do not trust password manager
applications to keep their passwords safe

"Not super interested, and keeping all of my
passwords in one place scares me.

Insufficient Awareness

Participant requires additional information about
password managers before deciding to take the
security action

"I am still thinking about it, I want to understand
how to use it and install it."

Individual Inhibitors
(Salience = 72%)
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“I didn't think it would be very useful at this point in
my life. I'm about to graduate and get all new emails
and accounts so maybe in the future when I'm all
settled in my full time job it will be more beneficial
and worth the effort to get a password manager
application.”
Low Self-efficacy
The final individual inhibitor (5% of participants)
related to the participants’ self-assessed ability to
successfully complete the recommended security action.
Self-efficacy, a central tenet of social cognitive theory
and the theory of planned behavior, represents an
individual’s belief that they are capable of performing a
specific behavior where higher self-efficacy results in
greater effort to persist in the face of obstacles [5]. A
small group of participants identified low self-efficacy
with computer technology as the primary reason they
did not take the security action.
"I feel as though I am not good enough with
computers to know how to install a password
manager so I'll just try to remember my passwords."
Others felt that perhaps the installation and use of the
password manager application itself was beyond their
capabilities.
“To add the password manager application onto my
computer seems simple enough, but getting all the
information in it and then using it seems a little bit too
complex. I will try the password manager application
after final exams when I am able to get some help
from my techie friend.”
4.2 Threat Apathy
The second most common theme or category of
behavior inhibitors was threat apathy. Threat apathy
occurs when individuals do not necessarily pay attention
to security because they just do not consider the
recommended information security action (and its
related threat) to be important [8, 37]. Exactly one
quarter (25%) of respondents felt that the threat of poor
password management was not a big enough concern for
them to change their current security behaviors.
“Although the survey made me more wary against
cyber security faults, I still don't feel it necessary to
have a password manager app.”
In many cases, the participants felt that their statusquo behaviors were sufficient for the threat, regardless
of the evidence about the consequences of poor
password management.
"I do not feel like I need one. I typically remember
most of my passwords even if it takes me a try or two

for a site so I do not have to enter the password very
often."
In some extreme cases (2% of the sample
population), participant hubris of their current password
management skills and memory (without a password
manager) exacerbated their threat apathy to a feeling of
invulnerability.
“I did not find my personal information to be in
danger because there is absolutely no way anyone
can guess my passwords but I can remember them.”
4.3 Technology Inhibitors
The final category of behavioral inhibitors (reported
by 20% of the participants) pertained to password
manager application technology itself. Our analysis
identified three factors (presented in order of highest
occurrence) about password manager application
technology that represented the main reasons for not
installing and using one.
Insufficient Awareness
Some participants (10%) reported that they were
interested in taking the recommended security action but
required more information about how to install and use
the actual tool in order to decide on moving forward
with the password manager application. This awareness
deficiency represents an explicit knowledge gap in the
participants’ understanding of how the technology
works and/or how to install and use it, as opposed to a
perceived lack of ability to do so (low self-efficacy).
“I have not researched and found a good one to use
yet."
One solution to their awareness deficiency, beyond
researching password managers themselves, was for
some participants to reach out to friends and family for
additional information and guidance on using password
managers.
“I have not asked some of the people I trust (my dad
and his work friends) if they use password
managers.”
A small group (2%) of participants reported concern
about the amount of space the password manager
application would take up on their electronic devices.
“I am not sure which one to use and where to
download it, and I am not sure how much space it
will take up on my computer.”
Alternative Solution
A small group of participants (7%) reported that they
were satisfied with their current password management
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system. The alternative solutions included relying on
personal memory for all passwords, writing the
passwords down in a physical notebook, and use of
built-in computer password managers (web browser
password storage, iCloud keychain, etc).
Lack of Trust
The final behavioral inhibitor related to the
technology is a lack of trust (5% of respondents) that
password managers will keep their information safe.
The main concerns were having all the passwords in one
location
“Not super interested, and keeping all of my
passwords in one place scares me.”
And storing the password bank on the Internet.
“I don't want my passwords online in one place.”
4.4 Inhibitors of High Behavioral Intent Participants
The behavioral inhibitors identified in sections 5.1
through 5.3 emerged from the analyses of all
participants’ responses in the sample and address the
first research question of why do home end-users fail to
adopt password management applications. In order to
address the second research question of why certain
home end-users have high behavioral intentions but then
fail to follow through on those intentions, we isolated
the coded responses for all participants that showed a
positive inclination (intention) towards taking the
security action (by selecting average behavioral intent
scores of 5 or greater on a 7 point Likert scale as
discussed in Section 3.2). Table 2 shows the ranked (in
order of occurrence) behavioral inhibitors for both the
entire sample and just the 59 participants that met the
positive intention criteria.
As seen on Table 2, those with higher behavioral
intention scores were not inhibited by trust or low-self
efficacy issues. Additionally, while the perceived lack
of time to install and use a password manager was still
the primary inhibitor between intent and actual
behavior, the order of precedence for the remaining
behavioral inhibitors differs noticeably between the two
groups. For example, the high-intention group showed
a relative decrease in the importance of threat apathy as
compared to the group as a whole. While the number of
subjects in the high-intent group is relatively small
(n=59), the results as shown in Table 2 suggest that
addressing behavioral inhibitors with this group requires
a different focus of effort in future threat messages and
security awareness campaigns compared to users with
lower intent scores.

Table 2: Group comparison of behavioral inhibitors
Code s
(Be havioral
Inhibitors)
Insufficient Time
Lack of Immediacy
Insufficient Awareness
Threat Apathy
Alternative Solution
Excessive Effort
Lack of Trust
Low Self-efficacy

High Be havioral
Inte nt Group
Relative
Ranking
1
2
3
4
5
6
N/A
N/A

Whole Sample

Occurences Relative
(n=59)
Ranking
35
1
8
3
7
5
6
2
5
6
3
4
0
7
0
8

Occurences
(n=236)
97
35
19
59
16
29
12
10

5. Discussion and Future Research
The main purpose of this study was to investigate
why home end-users adopt or fail to adopt (both
intentions and actual adoption) password management
applications.
On the surface, these applications
significantly reduce the risks associated with poor
password management and are, by all reported accounts,
very easy to use. Yet, adoption rates among home endusers is very low [24]. Through our analyses, we
identified three predominant categorical themes
consisting of eight individual behavioral inhibitors.
Individual factors such as lack of immediacy and
perceived lack of time were the most common reasons
why our study participants identified as not
downloading and using a password management
application.
Interestingly, a large portion of our subjects were
quite naïve in terms of the threat associated with poor
password management, which we labeled as threat
apathy. Even after seeing a password threat video
outlining the threat and its associated dangers, the
majority of subjects still did not recognize this as an
issue that needed solving, which is quite troubling given
the statistics related to poor password management
among home end-users. As a result, it is not surprising
that having a high level of threat apathy resulted in very
low adoption rates. Our subjects did identify technology
related issues inhibiting their adoption, but this was the
least important of our identified themes. This may be
the case, because most of these applications are very
easy to use (e.g., simplicity in use but complex in
design) and other factors besides the software were
driving the adopt versus not adopt decision.
Several of the identified behavioral inhibitors have
been explored in some fashion in previous security
behavior-related research, but that research was
primarily focused on better understanding the
antecedents of security behavioral intentions. For
example, Bulgurcu, et al. [11] developed and tested a
security behavior model that measured the effects of
self-efficacy, response-efficacy, and rational choice
perceived compliance costs on user attitudes toward an
intentions to follow general security policies by
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organizational employees. Likewise, Boss, et al. [8]
found that threat apathy was a deterrent to employee
intent to follow organizational security policies. What
makes our study unique is that we identified these
factors as potential inhibitors that affect the transition
between intent and actual behavior.
We intend to take the findings of this research to
improve the threat message about poor password
management by specifically addressing the key
behavioral inhibitors identified in the present study with
the goal of increasing the rate of successful security
behavior beyond the 13.5% experienced with the
existing threat message. Instead of a survey design for
phase 1, future research can implement an experimental
design with random assignment to one of several
different password threat messages in order to increase
adoption rates beyond the paltry 13.5%. Future research
can further investigate the perceived insufficient time
and lack of immediacy issues by, possibly,

demonstrating the quick installation and setup processes
and/or manipulating installation time in a controlled
experiment.
We believe that recent current events related to poor
password management, such as the major password
leaks at LinkedIn and resulting hack of FaceBook CEO
Mark Zuckerberg’s Twitter and Instagram accounts due
to reuse of a weak password that was included in the
LinkedIn data breach [32], will provide a more personal
connection to home end-users and possibly reduce the
effects of threat apathy on actual security behaviors.
Password managers can help solve a real and important
problem and it is important to theoretically and
practically understand why home end-users are not
adopting them. These types of systems may reduce
information security breaches associated with poor
password management practices.
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